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The Jailed Juror and Other Tales of Juror
Misconduct: Is Reform Required in Illinois?
*
LAURA A. CALDWELL* AND KIMBERLY A. WILKINS

INTRODUCTION

We received the phone call we were waiting for. The jury was back. After
rushing to the courthouse, we waited in anticipation as the verdict was read...
in favor of our opponents. Through forced smiles, we thanked the jurors as
they left the courtroom, but two holdout jurors for our client stayed behind.
We listened to the usual tales of juror woes: it had been hot in the jury room,
the other jurors were rude and obnoxious, so they had finally given up and
given in. But then they said something we had never heard before: did it matter
that the foreman had been in jail during part of deliberations? Hurried research
shortly thereafter revealed no case law in Illinois dealing with this fact pattern.
We knew we had to contest the verdict as tainted, but on what basis?
This article will report on some of the higher profile cases concerning
jury misconduct, as well as some practitioner accounts of such situations. We
will summarize Illinois' position on investigations into jury misconduct, then
examine common examples of such misconduct. Finally, we will suggest
possible reformative measures that could be taken to prevent, or better handle,
jury misconduct.
I. HIGH PROFILE AND OTHER INCIDENTS INVOLVING JUROR MISCONDUCT
Recently, incidents of juror misconduct seem to be more prevalent. A
number of widely publicized misconduct cases have been followed by not only
the legal community but the mainstream public and press as well. For example,
in Vancouver, British Columbia, Gillian Guess, a divorced mother of two, was

Laura Caldwell received a B.A. from University of Iowa in 1989 and her J.D. from
Loyola University of Chicago in 1992. She began her career at Clausen, Miller and was most
recently a partner at Worker & Power where she specialized in medical malpractice litigation.
She is currently taking a sabbatical from her law practice in order to focus on a writing career.
** Kim Wilkins of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtd., concentrates primarily in the
*

representation of health care providers in all aspects of medical malpractice cases from trial
through appeal. She graduated from Valpraiso University Law School in 1988, where she

served as a Note Editor for the Valpraiso University Law Review and a member of the Jessup
International Moot Court Team. She has served as the co-chair of the Chicago Bar
Association/Young Lawyers Division Federal Bar Training Course and has been a guest lecturer
for the American College of Surgeons.

NORTHERN IWLNOIS UNIVERSLTYA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21

convicted of obstruction of justice for having a sexual relationship with Peter
Gill, a murder defendant.' That affair occurred while Guess sat on the 1995
jury that acquitted Gill and five other men of a double murder.2 The public
followed Ms. Guess' obstruction of justice case as she appeared on cable TV
shows and through her own web site.3
Another high profile case of juror misconduct involved a jury foreman in
Miami, Florida, who was also brought to trial after being charged with selling
his vote in a major cocaine-smuggling case.' Prosecutors contended that
foreman, Miguel Moya, took money to vote and persuade others to vote
innocent in the trial of reputed drug kingpins Agusto "Willie.... Falcon and
Salvador "Sal" Magouta. s The pair was acquitted in February of 1996 of
charges that they smuggled seventy-five tons of cocaine from Columbia into
the United States.' Within days after the acquittal, Moya and his family began
living in luxury, buying a home, a motor boat, a vacation in Hawaii and other
personal items." A mistrial occurred in Moya's fist obstruction of justice trial
due to a deadlocked jury, but he was eventually convicted and is currently
serving a sentence of seventeen-and-a-half years.'
The most recent and high profile example of potential juror misconduct
in Illinois occurred in the trial of Rachel Barton v. Chicago & Northwestern
Transportation.Co.9 Following a verdict of $29.6 million on March 1, 1999,
in favor of the prize-winning violinist, Rachel Barton, lawyers discovered that
a juror, Alina Andrzejewski, had failed to disclose during jury selection that
she had her own personal injury suit pending in the Circuit Court of Cook
County.'" Andrzejewski also did not reveal that she had filed a worker's
compensation claim in 1986." On a subsequent post-trial motion, the judge
denied a new trial for the defendants."

1. Steven Pealstein, In Vancouver Trials, the Jury's Out-Sleeping with the
Defendants, THE WASHNGTON POST, Apr. 17, 2000, at A15.
2.

Id.

3. Her web site can be found at www.gillianguess.com.
4. David Kidwell, Jury Foreman ConvictedofTaking Bribe, MIA"IHERALD. July 24,
1999, at B1.
5. Id

6. Id.
7. Id
8. Id.; David Kidwell, 5 Convictedof Conspiracyin DrugCase, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.

14, 2000, at B1.
9. Cook County No. 95 L 929.
10.

Patricia Manson, Only Egregious Misconduct Warrants Opening Jury Room Door,

11.
12.

Id. at 1.
Id.

CtI. DAILY L. Buu., Mar. 23, 1999, at 1, 20.
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Accounts of juror misconduct do not always make the headlines,
however. Aaron Shepley, Mayor of Crystal Lake, Illinois and a litigator at
Swanson, Martin & Bell in Chicago, encountered an incident that abruptly
ended his first solo trial. Shepley's client, a medical professional, had already
spent a full day on the stand as an adverse witness, and Mr. Shepley was well
into his cross-examination of the plaintiff, when the court learned that a juror
3
had approached the defendant at the lunch break and asked to sit with him.
4
Caught in the classic "Catch 22," the defendant felt compelled to agree.'
Questioning by the judge revealed that no discussion had been held regarding
5
the facts of the case, but a mistrial was declared nonetheless.
William Kunkle, former Cook County Assistant State's Attorney who
prosecuted such notorious criminals as John Wayne Gacy, experienced a jury
misconduct issue of his own."6 While still a prosecutor, Kunkle tried and
convicted a defendant for the murder of two police officers. After the
conviction, it was discovered that during deliberations in the eligibility portion
of the two-phase death penalty hearing, one of the two male jurors had locked
7
himself in the bathroom and refused to deliberate.' The juror apparently
indicated that he had been "pushed around" by women his entire life and
wasn't going to take it anymore."8 Because the man steadfastly refused to leave
the bathroom or sign a verdict form indicating that the defendant was eligible
9
for the death penalty, a sentence of death was not imposed.' Despite notes
from the foreperson indicating "one juror refuses to deliberate," the state's plea
for a new jury for "good cause" was denied." The court sentenced the
defendant to life without parole. 2'
H. ILLINOIS' POSITION ON INVESTIGATION INTO JURY MISCONDUCT

The seminal case in Illinois on the issue of jury investigation is People v.
Holmes.2 2 Prior to Holmes, the general rule in Illinois was that the verdict of
a jury could not be impeached by the testimony of the jurors. In Holmes, the
13. Telephone interview with Aaron Shepley, Swanson, Martin & Bell (Jan. 14, 1999).
14.

Id.

16.

Telephone interview with William Kunkle, Cahill, Christian & Kunkle (Jan. 21,

15.
1999).

I1&

17.

Id.

19.

Id.

21.

Telephone interview with William Kunkle, Cahill, Christian & Kunkle (Jan. 21,

22.

372 N.E.2d 656 (Ill 1978).

18. Id.
20. Id.
1999).
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Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the general rule had been modified in
most jurisdictions. The court found that attempts to offer juror testimony to
impeach a jury verdict fell into two broad categories.' In the first category
were those instances in which a juror's testimony was offered to prove the
motive, method or process by which the jury reached its verdict. 2 Those,
according the Illinois Supreme Court, "almost without exception, have been
held inadmissible."' The second category involved those situations in which
the testimony of a juror "is offered as proof of conditions or events brought to
the attention of the jury without any attempt to show its effect on the jurors'
deliberations or mental processes. " 2' "In most jurisdictions such proof is
admissible." 27 The court also noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognized the identical distinction.' Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court
followed the trend and adopted Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which states that a juror should be permitted to testify to "whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any

juror."29

The court then considered whether the circumstances in Holmes required

reversal of the judgment. The court explained that not every instance in which

extraneous or unauthorized information reaches the jury results in error so
prejudicial as to require reversal.3 In Holmes, the extraneous information
brought to the attention of the jury was crucial to the question of the
defendant's identification. 3 Specifically, at trial, one of the arresting officers
testified that a shoe print with a "Florsheim" logo was found in the snow at the
scene of the crime and matched prints left in the snow by the defendant's
shoes.3 2 After trial, one of the jurors reported that several members of the jury
went to a Florsheim store during the trial and inspected various heels of shoes,
discussing the results of their investigation during deliberations.33 The court
found that the jury's investigation amounted to crucial evidence with which
the defendant had neither been confronted at trial nor had the opportunity to

23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

id. at 658.
Id
Id. at 656.

Id
People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656 (I11.1978).
Id. at 659-60.
Id. at 660 (quoting FED. R. EviD. 606(b)).
Id. at 661.
Id at 661-62.
People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 657 (111. 1978).
Id.
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refute." Under those circumstances, the court held that the investigation
resulted in35 error so prejudicial that the judgment must be reversed and
remanded.
ITl. COMMON EXAMPLES OF JUROR MISCONDUCT
A. UNAUTHORIZED VISITS TO THE SCENE

One of the first cases to discuss juror misconduct following the Holmes
decision was Heaver v. Ward.36 In Heaver, the actions of the jury's foreman
were called into question." Specifically, the foreman made an independent
visit to the intersection where the accident had occurred.38 While there, the
foreman made a diagram of the intersection, which he brought to the jury room
during deliberations.39 The foreman also brought a copy of "Rules of the
Road," an official booklet designed to instruct applicants for driver's licenses
in Illinois.4 The contents of the booklet were discussed by the jury during
deliberations. 4 ' Jurors testified inconsistently about who exactly brought the
booklet to the jury room and what effect the booklet and the diagram had on
their decisions.4' The court concluded, however, that it was irrelevant which
juror's testimony was correct because it was enough that the unauthorized
evidence directly related to issues in the case and may have improperly
influenced the verdict. 3 Accordingly, a new trial was granted."
One of the next cases in Illinois which discussed an unauthorized jury
visit to the scene was Brown v. Johnson.45 In Brown, one or more of the jurors
in a motorcycle collision trial went to the site where an eyewitness viewed the
accident, apparently to test that witness' credibility." The court of appeals
noted that although unauthorized extraneous information was brought to the
attention of the jury, the information, alone, did not necessitate reversal.4 "It
is only when the extraneous or unauthorized information that reaches the jury
34. Id at 661-62.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id at 662.
App. Ct. 1979).
386 N.E.2d 134 (IMI.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.

47.

Id.

Id.
Id.

Heaver v. Ward, 386 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
Id

Id.
44. Id.
45. 416 N.E.2d 799 (fI1. App. Ct. 1981).
at802.
46. Id.
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is prejudicial to the losing party that a reversal is required." The court then
analyzed the circumstances of the case, noting that the physical conditions at
the scene were vital to the jury's understanding of the events which transpired
and that the scene in question had undergone material changes after the
collision. 9 The court held that under those circumstances, the unsupervised
visit by the jury to the accident scene was prejudicial."
While still following Holmes, a court of appeals in Illinois reached a
5 1 In Birch,
different result in Birch v. Township of Drummer.
during
deliberations, two jurors visited the scene in question to inspect the allegedly
dangerous curve which led to the automobile accident.52 The court commenced
its decision by discussing the procedural requirements invoked when
extraneous information is brought to the jury's attention, emphasizing that not
every instance of such extraneous information results in reversible error and
that only when the losing party suffers prejudice, is reversal required. 3 The
court explained that the losing party does not have to prove actual prejudice,
but needs only to show that the unauthorized information related directly to an
issue in the case and may have improperly influenced the verdict.' Upon such
a showing, the burden is then placed on the prevailing party to demonstrate
that no injury or prejudice resulted." The court compared the circumstances
of its case with those in Brown v. Johnson,%stating:
Unlike Brown, the plaintiff here does not allege the
intersection had changed since the accident . . . . We
recognize that, like most accident cases, the physical
characteristics of the accident scene were crucial to the
outcome of the case. The parties, however, did not dispute
these characteristics. They disagreed only on the
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. 7
Therefore, the court in Birch intimated that it was unlikely that any prejudice
resulted from the investigation, but ultimately did not rule on the issue since
the plaintiff failed to properly preserve it for appeal.58
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 803.
Brown v. Johnson, 416 N.E.2d 799, 803 (I1. App. Ct. 1981).
487 N.E.2d 798 (Il. App. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 806.
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id.
See supratext accompanying notes 45-50.
Birch v. Township of Drummer, 487 N.E.2d 798, 807 (iI. App. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 807-08.
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The more recent case of Wade v. City of ChicagoHeightsi' considered a

situation where one of the jurors merely drove by the scene of the accident. In
Wade, the plaintiffs alleged the accident was caused by the presence of a
construction hole in the middle of the street, which the City of Chicago
Heights had created while performing repairs.' The city presented evidence
that the hole had been surrounded by three barricades." One juror in the case,
after driving by the scene, concluded that the plaintiff must have known the
barricades were present since he would have driven by that location several
times previously.62 The court conducted a voir dire of the other jurors, who
indicated that while the extraneous information did not affect their ability to
be impartial, several believed that the offending juror had changed his mind
about the case after reviewing the accident scene.63 Although such testimony
by the jurors was essentially evidence relating the effect of outside influences,
the court concluded that the circumstances present at the accident scene were
directly related to one of the core issues in the case - namely whether the
barricades were visible to the plaintiff, such that he could have avoided the
collision." Further, the court noted that the juror's investigation of the scene
may have led him to change his mind about the verdict. 5 Therefore, the
verdict in favor of the plaintiff was reversed."
In conclusion, Illinois courts follow the general rule that although the
active viewing of an accident scene is per se misconduct by jurors, such a
viewing will only overturn a verdict when the losing party is prejudiced by the
viewing. The losing party need not show actual prejudice, but only needs to
show that the unauthorized evidence directly related to issues in the case and
may have improperly influenced the verdict. Where the accident scene has
changed since the time of the accident, an unsupervised visit will most likely
be prejudicial unless the physical characteristics of the scene are not in dispute.
Finally, it should be noted that as the courts consider the issue of whether the
visit may have improperly influenced the verdict, they often find themselves
discussing whether it actually did, despite the general rule against delving into
a jury's motive, method or process.

59.
60.
61.

693 N.E.2d 426 (11. App. Ct. 1998).
Id. at428.
Id.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Wade v. City of Chicago Heights, 693 N.E.2d 426, 436 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
Id.
Id.

62.

ld. at 436.
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B. PHYSICAL INTIMIDATION OR COERCION BY OTHER JURORS

As noted above, ajuror may not impeach ajury's verdict by subsequently
providing an affidavit or testimony which shows the motive, method or
process by which the verdict was reached." Accordingly, evidence regarding
a juror's reasoning or what persuaded a juror to vote as he or she did is
inadmissible." 8 However, a verdict may be impeached if evidence of physical
intimidation is revealed.6
In People v. Reid, a 1991 case, an Illinois appellate court considered a
situation where a juror received a threatening phone call while sequestered at
a motel during deliberations." Specifically, on the way to the motel, it was
revealed that this juror was the one remaining holdout for acquittal on an
armed robbery count.7 That evening, the juror received a telephone call in
which a male voice said, "you son of a bitch, we'll get you for that."' The
juror did not recognize the voice on the phone and did not report the phone call
to the sheriff or the court." The next morning, the jury returned a guilty verdict
on the armed robbery count as well as a guilty verdict on the other count.7 4
Subsequently, the defendant appealed asserting that the telephone call was
prejudicial because it had been made by a fellow juror who was upset that the
juror in question was holding out on the armed robbery charge." The appellate
court held that the juror should not have been able to testify as to the effect that
the telephone call had on his mental processes. 76
The court then considered whether the verdict had been impeached by the

call." Finding that there were no similar cases on point, the court considered
cases from other jurisdictions, including a case where a holdout juror, an elderly woman, became physically ill after being screamed at by another juror.78

67. See People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656,658 (111. 1978); People v. Preston, 391 N.E.
2d 359, 366 (111. 1979); see also People v. McDonald, 660 N.E.2d 832, 848 (111. 1995).
68. See People v. Tucker, 550 N.E.2d 581,586 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
69. See Palanti v. Dillon Enterprises, Ltd., 707 N.E.2d 695, 704 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999);
People v. Rhoden, 625 N.E.2d 940, 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); People v. Wilson, 615 N.E.2d
1283, 1290 (Il. App. Ct. 1993); People v. Lee, 691 N.E.2d 117, 122 (111. App. Ct. 1998); see
also People v. Reid, 583 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
70. 583 N.E.2d at 1-2 (i1. App. Ct. 1991).
71. Id.
72. Id. at2.
73. Id.
74. People v. Reid, 583 N.E.2d 1, 2 (il.
App. Ct. 1991).
75. Id. at3.
76. Id.
77. Id
78. Id. The case involving the elderly woman was People v. Kennan, 758 P.2d 1081
(Cal. 1988).
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The court also found a case where a juror's coercive actions included throwing
a chair.79 In both of those cases, the courts found that the conduct was
insufficient to warrant impeachment of the verdict."0 The court in Reid noted
that in the situation at hand there was no physical act of intimidation and that
all jurors had agreed with the verdict in open court."' Accordingly, the court
concluded that the phone call was not sufficient to impeach the verdict.8 2
As in Reid, Illinois courts have been firm in refusing to consider the
motive, method or process by which the jury reached its verdict in cases
involving possible physical intimidation or coercion. For example, in People
v. Wilson,8 3 an Illinois appellate court considered a defendant's argument that
the trial court had failed to conduct a hearing to determine whether one juror
coerced another juror into voting guilty by misinforming the juror about the
effect of a not guilty verdict." After the defendant's trial, a juror contacted
defense counsel because she feared that the jury's verdict was improper.5 The
court held that since the information provided by the juror pertained not to any
physical intimidation or excluded events brought to the jury's attention but to
what influenced her decision-making, it could not impeach the jury's verdict,
even if true."
In the case of Sale v. Allstate Insurance Company, 7 the court of appeals

did not even consider whether physical intimidation had occurred where the
foreman gave the jury only one hour to reach a verdict and walked around the
room in a frustrated manner hitting the door and performing other intimidating
conduct.88 Instead, the court noted that testimony and affidavits of jurors could
not be used to show that the jury misunderstood the instructions or the law, the
effect of a particular finding, or of their verdict.8 9 Accordingly, no statements
by jurors could be used to explain or change the meaning of the verdict, and,
therefore, the trial court had properly denied the plaintiff's motion for a new
trial predicated upon the affidavit of a juror. 9'

79. People v. Reid, 583 N.E.2d 1, 3 (flI. App. Ct. 1991). The case that the court cited
for the chair-throwing incident was People v. Jacobson, 440 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1981).
80. People v. Reid, 583 N.E.2d at 4.
81. l
82. Id.
83. 615 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
84. Id. at 1289.
85. Id
86. Id. at 1290.
87. 467 N.E.2d 1023 (I1.App. Ct. 1984).
88. id. at 1036.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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In several other cases, Illinois courts have refused to overturn verdicts
because of the allegedly intimidating conduct of jurors. In the case of People
v. Rhoden," the court struck references in a defendant's brief to a juror's
affidavit without discussing whether physical intimidation occurred simply
because the juror's affidavit revealed the motive, method and process by which
the jury reached its verdict. 92In another similar case, People v. Lee,93 the court,
without stating the content of jurors' affidavits, concluded simply that they did
not reveal physical intimidation or excluded events to which the jury had
become aware." Instead, the affidavits revealed only the motive, method and
process by which the jury reached the verdict, and therefore, could not be used
to impeach the verdict. 9
Finally, in the Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. Hobley,9 the
defendant claimed that he was prejudiced by the improper conduct of the
foreperson who allegedly sought to intimidate other jurors by offering himself
as an expert in the area of proper police conduct and showing everyone his gun
on the first day of jury selection." In further support of the intimidation
allegation, the defendant relied upon jurors' affidavits that stated that the
foreperson "wanted everyone to know that he was a police officer," that the
foreperson "said that Hobley was guilty and that our decision was going to be
unanimous," and that the foreperson and other jurors "wore down" a holdout
juror, persuading her to change her vote to guilty." The court disagreed that
the foreman's conduct of bringing a gun into the jury room, electing himself
foreman, and otherwise intimidating the other jurors constituted an improper
extraneous influence on the other jurors." Again, like many cases before, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Hobley found that the defendant's claim went to the
motive, method and process by which the jury had reached its verdict,(* The
court felt that the defendant was seeking to show how a particular juror was
influenced by other jurors during the deliberations.' 0 ' Since the evidence
offered by the defendant pertained merely to the deliberative process of the

91.
92.
93.
94.

625 N.E.2d 940 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
ld. at 943.
691 N.E.2d 117 (111. App. C. 1998).
Id. at 122.

96.

696 N.E.2d 313 (Il1.1998).

95.

97.
98.

99.
100.
101.

Id.

Id. at 341.
Id.

Id. at 342.
Id
People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 342 (Ill. 1998).
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jury in reaching its verdict, the court found that the defendant was not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on the issue."
In conclusion, Illinois courts adhere strictly to the rule that the motive,
method or process by which a jury reached its verdict will not be considered
even when physical intimidation or coercion is found. Indeed, although Illinois
courts often state that a verdict may be impeached where it was the result of
physical intimidation, no verdict has been impeached in this state on such
grounds.
C. COMMUNICATION WITH NON-JURORS

Juror misconduct can also arise in the form of communication between
a juror and outside parties - for example, third persons, judges or bailiffs. For
many years in Illinois, it was a strict rule that ex parte communications with
jurors were plain error even if there was no improper motive or effect on the
juror. 3 However, the rule evolved judicially; now, communications between
jurors and outside parties do not result in a verdict being set aside if it is
apparent that no injury or prejudice resulted from the improper
communication.'" The standard to be applied was explained in People v.

Mitchell:

It is well settled in Illinois that any communication with a
juror during trial about a matter pending before the jury is
deemed presumptively prejudicial to a defendant's right to
a fair trial. Although this presumption of prejudice is not
conclusive, the burden rests upon the state to establish that
such contact with a juror was harmless to defendant.
[Citations] A verdict will not be set aside where it is obvious
that no prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury,
either by the court or by third persons outside the presence
of the defendant.'°5
In Mitchell, a juror on a murder case heard the defendant's mother comment,
"I hope you slept well last night," but the juror was unclear whether the
comment was made to her and, in fact, stated that the mother had not even
Id.
103. See People v. Childs, 636N.E.2d534,539(111. 1994); People v. McGrane, 168 N.E.
321, 323 (I1. 1929); Crabtree v. Hagengaugh, 23 I1.289 (1860).
104. See People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 343 (111. 1998); People v. Mitchell, 604
N.E.2d 877, 910 (111. 1992); People v. Childs, 636 N.E.2d 534, 542 (111. 1994).
105. Mitchell, 604 N.E.2d at 910 (quoting People v. Harris, 526 N.E.2d 335, 342 (I1.
102.

1988)).
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looked at her when she spoke the words."° The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the defendant
was not prejudiced since the juror stated she did not know if the comment was
made to her, did not repeat the comment to any other juror until the death
sentence was decided upon and stated that the comment did not affect her vote
to sentence the defendant to death.'0 7 Although Illinois courts have indicated
that' they will not consider the effect of any misconduct on the jury's
deliberative process, the Illinois Supreme Court did consider that factor in
Mitchell. The court specifically explained that the communication by the
defendant's mother did not affect the jurors' votes to impose the death penalty
upon the defendant.'0 8
The Illinois Supreme Court also applied the Mitchell standard to a
situation involving communications between jurors and outside persons who
were in no way involved with the trial or the parties to the case." Specifically,
People v. Hobley involved a situation where jurors eating in a hotel restaurant
during their sequestration were approached by other patrons who urged them
to convict the defendant and impose the death penalty."' The jurors authored
affidavits indicating they were upset and shaken by the incident."' The Illinois
Supreme Court found that those affidavits were sufficient to warrant an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the incident resulted in prejudice to
the defendant." 2 Subsequently, without actually ruling on the issue, the court
that it is obvious that no prejudice resulted
commented, "We cannot conclude
3
from the hotel incident.""
As noted above, communications are not only improper between jurors
and laypersons, but may also be improper when communications occur
between a jury and a judge. In People v. Childs,114 the trial judge was at lunch
with the assistant state's attorney when the jury submitted a note stating, "Can
the defendant be guilty of armed robbery and voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter or must murder be the only option with armed robbery?""' The
judge instructed his deputy to give the jury the following response, "You have
receiVed your instructions as to the law, read them and continue to

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
III.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 909.
Id. at909-10.
Id. at 910.
See People v. Hobley, 696 N.E.2d 313, 340 (I1: 1998).
Id. at339-40.
Id.
Jd. at 341.
Id.
636 N.E.2d 534 (111. 1994).
Id. at538.
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deliberate.""' 6 However, the judge did not contact defense counsel, even
though a phone number for that attorney was available. " The Illinois Supreme
Court reviewed the law concerning ex parte communications with jurors, as
well as the general law concerning jury inquiries. "8 Noting that the burden was
on the prosecution, not the defendant, to prove that the exparte response was
harmless beyond a doubt, the court held that the trial court had engaged in ex
parte communication with the jury that was tantamount to giving the jury no
answer to their inquiry and failed to provide the jury with any guidance."
Because it was not apparent to the court that the communication was not a
factor in the verdict, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the state failed to
show that the expartecommunication was harmless.'o Accordingly, the court
affirmed the2 judgment of the appellate court reversing the defendant's
conviction.m'
In a similar case, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a situation where
the jury sent the judge a note asking whether they could ensure a murder
defendant would not be paroled." The judge responded exparte by returning
a note stating, "A verdict must be arrived at on the basis of the evidence you
have been given."'" The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the judge's exparte communication with the jury was error that,
alone, required reversal." However, the court found that the communication,
in conjunction with other errors by the trial court, collectively required that the
death penalty be vacated since under the collective facts it was not "apparent
that no injury or prejudice resulted."'
Comments made by a bailiff to jurors may also constitute ex parte
communications requiring reversal of a verdict. In the case of Waller v.
Bagga,'26 a bailiff commented to jurors in a personal injury case that the case
"should never have come to court" and made other statements to that effect. 27
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, which was reduced for
contributory negligence." The Illinois appellate court held that the comments
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were clearly improper, but instead of reviewing the situation by the standard
noted in Mitchell, the court used a People v. Holmes analysis of whether the
comments were unauthorized evidence relating to issues in the case.' 3 The
court held that the comments did not require reversal since they were not
relevant to a critical issue in the case.'" Further, it was unclear whether the
comments were rendered to all jurors, and it did not appear that the comments
were considered by the jury during its deliberations.' 3'
Finally, in a recent case, People v. Fieberg,"' an Illinois court
considered a situation where it was unclear who had made the ex parte
communication.' 33 The defendant in Frieberg alleged that juror misconduct
occurred when one juror found in her notepad a piece of paper with the word
"guilty" handwritten on it and failed to inform the trial court or counsel." In
support of the claim, the defendant attached an affidavit from the juror
indicating that she noticed the piece of paper sticking out of her notepad and
found the word written in another person's handwriting."' 5 She was very
surprised and disturbed to see it but essentially forgot about it until sometime
after the trial. 3 The juror also averred that she never mentioned the note to
anyone else during the trial, and no other jurors mentioned receiving similar
notes. ' Although the court did not directly review whether reversal was
required, the court concluded that the allegations were not sufficient to make
The court
a substantial showing to require an evidentiary hearing.'
specifically stated that the "note simply did not prejudice defendant such that
he was denied his right to a fair trial."' 9
In conclusion, issues concerning communications by jurors with outside
persons is considered by a standard different than that of most other juror
misconduct issues. The courts are to shift the burden away from the
complaining party to the non-complaining party who must show that the
contact with the jurors was harmless. A verdict will not be set aside where it
is obvious that no prejudice resulted. At least one case has failed to apply this
129. Id. at 1074-75. See supra text accompanying note 105 for a description of the
Mitchell standard; supra text accompanying notes 22-29 for an explanation of the People v.
Holmes analysis.
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standard and instead applied the usual analysis of whether the unauthorized
communication related to issues in the case." Lastly, as in many of the
previous areas of juror misconduct, the courts are not to look to any effect on
the jury's deliberations, but in attempting to determine whether any prejudice
resulted, they often stumble into that territory.
D. JURY CONSULTATION OF OUTSIDE SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION

Another category of cases addressing claims of jury misconduct involve
situations in which jurors consult outside substantive information. The Holmes
case itself would fall in this category, as the jurors visited the Florsheim shoe
store to look at shoe heel types."" Other Illinois cases in this category, which
are discussed below, involve consultation by the jury of a wide array of
sources, including guidebooks, almanacs and dictionaries.
In general, Illinois courts find consultation of outside, substantive matters
to be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial only if those matters were
not previously introduced into evidence or if they were not matters within the
common experience of laypersons. For example, in Frede v. Downs' 4 during
jury deliberations in a boating accident trial, one of the jurors brought into the
jury room a book entitled, Piloting,Seamanship and Small Boat Handling."
The court in Frede found that the trial court improperly denied a post-trial
motion by the plaintiff to set aside the verdict as to one of the defendants.'"
The trial court, in accordance with Holmes, limited its inquiry to the use of the
book rather than considering its effect, if any, upon the decision-making
process of the jurors."' However, the appellate court found that the plaintiff
had made the requisite showing of probability of prejudice, in light of the fact
that the jury read from the book about the rules and duties of skippers, and that
those duties were specifically at issue in the trial.'"
Another Illinois case concerning jury consultations of substantive
information was decided by an Illinois appellate court in Haight v. Aldridge
Electric Co. 47 Haight involved a truck-car collision at an intersection which
occurred at 8:30 p.m. 4" At trial, several witnesses testified concerning the
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conditions of visibility at the time of the collision.'49 During deliberations, one
of the jurors informed the others that he had looked at an almanac which
reflected that the sunset occurred at around 6 p.m. on the day of the
collision.'" The court held that the juror's consultation of the almanac was
directly related to a crucial issue in the case - visibility - and that upon its
showing, the burden shifted to the prevailing party in the lower court to
demonstrate that no prejudice resulted."' The court found that the burden was
not met, and reasoned that while conflicting evidence was presented at trial
regarding the visibility conditions at the time of the collision, none of the
parties presented evidence as to the time of sunset that evening.'52 Therefore,
the court ordered a new trial after concluding that the almanac constituted
evidence that related directly to a crucial issue with which the plaintiff
had
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A different result was reached in Templeton v. Chicago andNorthwestern
TransportationCo." In Templeton, the defendant argued that it was entitled

to a new trial because a juror brought a textbook into the jury room entitled
Introduction to FinancialManagement, which contained various discussions

of interest rates and inflation. 55 Subsequent testimony by the jurors established
that the book was in the jury room but that it was not actually read by the
jurors.' 5' Rather, during deliberations, in a discussion regarding the amount of
damages to award, the juror to whom the book belonged argued that interest
rates would rise with inflation and stated that his position was supported by his
textbook but did not actually open the book.' " The court in Templeton found
that no injury or prejudice resulted from the mere presence of the book in the
jury room.15
Illinois jurors have also sought the assistance of dictionaries for
definitions during deliberations. In Danhof v. Richland Township,'59 the jury
used a two-volume Webster's Dictionary, which was not admitted into
evidence, to look up the word "proximate.""lW After the verdict was reached,
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the presence and use
149.
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of material taken into the jury room during deliberations, ultimately finding
that the verdict was not tainted by the use of the dictionary."' The appellate
court affirmed, finding that the plaintiff was not so substantially prejudiced by
the presence of the dictionary as to require a reversal and that the Webster's
Dictionarydefinition of "proximate" did not contradict, nullify or negate the
trial court's jury instruction on proximate cause.1 2
In Macias v. Cincinnati Forte,"3 one of the jurors went to the library
during trial and researched certain legal terms in Black's Law Dictionary,
including "negligence," "reasonable," "reasonable conduct," "strict liability,"
"defective condition," and "product liability.""1 He also researched the
elements and defenses of negligence." He kept his research with him
throughout the trial and during deliberations in the form of notes, which were
copied "pretty much" verbatim from Black's Law Dictionary.'" The court in
Macias followed Holmes in initially noting that not every instance in which67
unauthorized information reaches the jury results in reversible error.
"Because the actual effect of the extraneous information on the minds of the
jury cannot be proved, the standard to be applied is whether the conduct
involved such a probability that prejudice would result that it is to be deemed
inherently lacking in due process."'" The court in Maciasfound persuasive the
decision of Danhof v. Richland Township, where the jurors consulted
69
Webster's Dictionary for the definition of "proximate."' As in Danhof, in
Macias, the definitions obtained from Black's Law Dictionarydid not conflict
or substantially differ from the instructions given to the jury by the trial
court.'7 Even though some of the definitions consulted had not been
7
discussed during the trial, the court found that no prejudice resulted. '
A similar result was reached in Pietrzakv. Rush-Presbyterian-St.Luke's
Medical Center,12 a medical malpractice action in which jurors consulted
dictionaries for the concept of timeliness. The plaintiff in Pietrzakargued that
it was to be presumed that any extraneous matter brought before the jury was
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misleading, absent rebuttal by the proponent of the verdict.'" The court in
Pietrzakfound the plaintiff's assertion incorrect, citing Macias in explaining
that the losing party must first prove that the unauthorized information relates
directly to an issue in the case and may have improperly influenced the
verdict. 74 The court then analyzed the particular circumstances of the case.' 75
One juror consulted the dictionary for the definition of "timely," which
provided "occurring at a suitable or opportune time; well-timed."' 76 She did
not share her dictionary definition with other members of the jury.' " The court
found that the definition did not contradict the court's jury instruction and
found the consultation harmless. 'I Another juror informed the jury of the
definitions he found, including "time - measure of duration" and "duration a limit of time."' ' The plaintiffs contended that this definition imposed an
increased burden to prove that defendants had failed to provide proper medical
care within a measurable "limit of time," whereas plaintiffs were only required
to prove that medical care was not "timely."' m The court disagreed, finding
that an examination of timeliness required a measurable limit of time.' 8'
Moreover, although the plaintiffs attempted to cite individual jurors as to how
the definitions affected their deliberations, the court stated that "evidence
relating to the effect of outside influences on the mental processes of jury
members is inadmissible ... . Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the
extraneous definitions may have improperly influenced the verdict, and, thus
the trial court did not abuse its discretion."'8
As demonstrated above, a court will generally not grant a new trial if a
juror's consultation of outside substantive information does not produce any
information that is outside the scope of common experience or knowledge.
However, where more detailed information is learned, the courts will often
find a probability of prejudice and hold that a new trial is warranted. It is the
nature of the information, and not its effect on the jurors' deliberations, which
must be examined.
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E. MISSING OR ADDITIONAL JURORS

A less common type of juror misconduct occurs when a juror is
discovered missing or too many jurors deliberate. In Illinois, a defendant has
8 3
a right to know the composition of the jury that will deliberating on his case."
The Bill of Rights of the Illinois Constitution provides, "[t]he right of trial by
jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate."'" The Illinois Supreme
Court has defined "inviolate" to mean "unhurt, uninjured, unpolluted,
unbroken.""' The unbroken right of trial by jury is a constitutional cornerstone
of our judicial system. "This right should be guarded zealously; neither a trial
judge's inadvertent omissions nor ajuror' s failure to divulge possibly pertinent
information nor a trial attorney's laxness can be allowed to impair this
fundamental right."'"M However, that right has been violated in several cases
where either a juror is found to be absent during deliberations, or where an
additional "juror" deliberates with the panel.
In People v. Babbington,an alternate juror was excused when the regular
jury of 12 began deliberating.iS7 However, the excused alternate apparently did
not leave because when the verdict was returned, the signed verdict form
contained the alternate's signature and omitted the signature of one of the
regular jurors.'" When the trial court polled the jury, the transcript showed
that 13 jurors, including regular juror Willie Nunn and alternate juror Loutitia
Smith, assented orally." 9 The convicted defendant did not raise this issue
before raising it in his appellate brief." The appellate court reviewed the
9
issue, however, finding it an issue of plain error.' ' The court held:
It is clear that alternate juror Smith was excused by the trial
court and told that she would not be deliberating with the
jury. It is also clear that Smith somehow ended up
deliberating with the regular jurors since she signed the
verdict forms and responded to the poling of the jurors.
What is not clear, however, is whether she deliberated
instead of one of the regular jurors or in addition to the 12
regular jurors. Either scenario would have caused defendant
183. People v. Babbington, 676 N.E.2d 1326, 1333 (i1. App. Ct. 1997).
184. People ex rel Denny v. Traeger, 22 N.E.2d 679, 682 (I!. 1939).
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prejudice. If alternate juror Smith deliberated instead of
regularjuror Nunn, this arrangement probably resulted from
a collusion between Smith and Nunn. The change in jurors
occurred without the knowledge or consent of defendant, or
even the State or the court. This was certainly prejudicial to
defendant, since a defendant has a right to know the
composition of the jury that will be deliberating on his
case.192

The court in Babbington noted that the other possible explanation was
that the defendant was tried by 13 jurors, alternate juror Smith and the 12
regular jurors."' The court recognized that the presence of alternate jurors has
been considered in other cases and has resulted in prejudice if the alternates
participated in deliberations either verbally or through body language, or if the
presence of the alternates had a chilling effect on the regular jurors."9 The
Babbington court concluded:
In the instant case, it is clear that Smith participated in the
deliberations since she signed the verdict forms and
responded to the judge's polling. We, therefore, cannot say
that her presence had no impact on the jury's verdict. Thus,
regardless of whether Smith deliberated instead of a regular
juror or in addition to the 12 regular jurors, there is no doubt
that Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial.'"
The importance of a missing or absent juror has been discussed in another
Illinois case. '" In Hughes v. People, the illness of a juror resulted in his mental
absence, in the form of unconsciousness, for a few hours during
deliberations.1 However, the temporary absence was found to be not
prejudicial because:
The affidavits of a number of jurors were taken, and they all
show no discussion of the case was had by any of them until
after the juror was so far restored that he could and did take
part in their deliberations. That being so, there was nothing
in the sickness of the juror that was prejudicial to defendant.
It is fully shown defendant had the benefit of the judgment
192. People v. Babbington, 676 N.E.2d 1326, 1332-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
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of this juror, as well as that of all others in their
deliberations on his case. 198
No Illinois case law has yet addressed the absence and return of a juror
during deliberations, which is akin to the situation mentioned at the beginning
of this article where the foreman was actually in jail during part of
deliberations. However, an analogous case in Arizona addressed an identical
constitutional right to that found in Illinois.'" The court in Arizona concluded
that a defendant is entitled to know the make-up of his jury based on that
constitutional right.'
Perkinsv. Komarnyckyj involved a medical malpractice case tried before
10 jurors.") During deliberations, the jury sent a written question to the judge
asking whether any jurors who found for the defendant should take part in the
determination of damages.' The judge responded by saying that "[tihe jurors
who agree on liability are the ones who should fix damages and sign the form
of the verdict.",203 The Supreme Court of Arizona began its analysis by noting
the general rule that although neither party may cause a jury error, and often
neither benefits from starting over, "the risk of such mistakes by jurors is a
cost of the right to trial by jury." The court found that the trial judge's
instruction, "telling the jurors that those voting against liability would not
5
participate in the determination of other issues, was itself erroneous." The
court explained: "The principle is simple. The constitutional right of trial by
jury carries with it the right to have every issued tried by the jury that has been
empanelled, not by two-thirds of that jury, or three-fourths, or any other
fraction."' The court concluded that the defendants were "[d]eprived of their
'
right to have all of the jurors participate in deciding all of the issues."
In a similar case from New York, only five of six jurors in a civil trial
assented to the verdict upon being polled.' 8 The sixth juror stated thatshe had
"no response." The trial court denied a request to question the juror, and
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judgment was entered on the verdict.2"' On appeal, the court stated: "[t]he
parties are entitled to a process in which each juror deliberated on all issues
and attempts to influence with his or her individual judgment and persuasion
the reasoning of the other five."2 "' The court ordered a new trial. '
The above case law demonstrates that the existence of prejudice is
considered in determining whether jury absences or additions should merit a
new trial. As demonstrated in People v. Babbington, regardless of whether the
excused alternate juror deliberated instead of another juror or in addition to all
of the regular jurors, the defendant was denied his right to a fair trial and a new
trial was warranted.2"3 Illinois also recognizes the "duty of jurors in making
to consult with each other, and not to act each independently
up their verdict
' 214
of the other.
F. UNTRUTHFUL JURORS

As in the case of Rachel Barton v. Chicago & Northwestern
TransportationCo., parties frequently request new trials based upon newly
discovered evidence indicating that a juror made false statements during voir
dire.
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Olinger't" was faced with such
a situation when a juror wrote a letter, which was subsequently published in
a newspaper, expressing viewpoints that the criminal justice system should be
changed so that a criminal defendant would be presumed guilty until he proved
his innocence. 26 The trial court in Olinger permitted a discovery deposition
of the challenged juror to determine whether, at the time of trial, that juror
followed her oath as a juror and later- found that the deposition supported
denial of the defendant's claim for a new trial. 21"7 The trial court's decision was
ultimately affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test
to be applied in determining whether a party is entitled to a new trial due to
false statements made by jurors during voir dire examination.2t
Under the Olingertest, a new trial is required if the movant establishes
that (1) a juror answered falsely on voir dire and (2) prejudice resulted
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therefrom.2 19 Therefore, based on the Olingertest, actual prejudice is required
in such instances.m Moreover, the burden of showing that the juror is not
impartial is on the party challenging the juror.22 The determination on this
issue, however, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and in the
absence of clear abuse, that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.'
Another case on the subject is HarrisTrust & Savings Bank v. AbrahamZwirn, 2m where a court considered the situation of a juror who did not
volunteer information that she attended law school at Loyola University when
Loyola University Medical Center was one of the defendants in the case.
Specifically, the juror had informed the plaintiff's attorney during voir dire
that as an in-house insurance defense attorney, she often retained Loyola
physicians as expert witnesses.' When further queried about her relationship
with Loyola, the plaintiff's attorney refined his question to pertain only to
Loyola's medical facility, and the juror answered that she had no particular
relationship to it. 2' The plaintiffs. attorney never asked her what law school
she attended. 226 The appellate court upheld the trial judge's denial of the
plaintiff s motion to remove the juror for cause after the fact, stating, "We find
Mulroy truthfully answered each question asked of her. If the plaintiffs
attorney wanted to know more, he should have inquired. We have found no
authority for the proposition that a juror must volunteer information not
requested.""
In the Rachel Barton case,m the parties were faced with a situation where
ajuror had not only been untruthful during voirdire, but had she told the truth,
that information would have led to her disqualification. Illinois legislation
requires disqualification of potential jurors who have served on juries within
the previous year, or who are parties to a suit pending for trial in that court.
Specifically, Section 14 of the Illinois Jury Act provides:
It shall be sufficient cause of challenge of a petit juror that
he lacks any one of the qualifications mentioned in Section
2 of this Act; or if he is not one of the regular panel, that he
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has served as a juror on the trial of a cause in any court in
the county within one year previous to the time of his being
offered as a juror; or that he is a party to a suit pendingfor
trial in that court. It shall be the duty of the court to
discharge from the panel all jurors who do not possess the
qualifications provided in this Act, as soon as the fact is
discovered. 229
A trial court does not have discretion to allow a juror to serve if that juror
is subject to statutory disqualification.' Illinois courts have held that a juror
is "a party to a suit pending for trial" when the juror has pending traffic tickets
or divorce actions, 3 ' when he has a case pending in the building court, 2 or
where he has been charged with a crime. 3
Therefore, a distinction appears to exist between potential jurors and
empanelled jurors. Prior to empanelling, jurors must be disqualified if they
meet one of the two disqualifying tests. After empanelling, Illinois law holds
that even though such jurors may have been disqualified if they had been
truthful about certain matters during voir dire, a showing of actual prejudice
will still be required for a new trial.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are four possible reformative measures that should be considered
in Illinois to help prevent, or better handle, jury misconduct. The first is the
use of clearer and more explicit instructions to jurors prior to voir dire and
again when the jury has taken their oath. Certainly, the jurors are always told
not to be offended when one of the attorneys or parties walks by them in the
hallway without acknowledgment, but do the jurors understand the effect they
could have or the penalty they could undergo if they actually speak to such
persons? Surely, Gillian Guess, the juror who had sexual relations with the
murder defendant during trial,' knew she was doing something improper, but
did she realize she could be put on trial herself and imprisoned for her actions?
More specific instructions about communications with outside persons and the
importance of juror truthfulness during voir dire could mitigate any such
confusion. In addition, with the seemingly unlimited access to information
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today via the Internet, jurors need to be explicitly told, now more than ever,
that the only information they are to consider is the evidence they receive
during trial. These instructions should clearly state that jurors are not to
perform any of their own research, whether by means of textbooks,
dictionaries, Internet web sites or a visit to the scene.
Illinois has recently amended Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239 and now
allows certain jury instructions (such as those dealing with burden of proof)
to be read before opening statements.f 5 Cautionary instructions would be an
excellent addition to these pre-evidentiary instructions.
The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, has recently taken a step in
the right direction with respect to early warnings to jurors. Over the last few
years, Cook County has begun showing potential jurors a video that introduces
them to the jury system. The video is shown prior to any jurors being called
to a courtroom for voir dire. In that video, Lester Holt, a Chicago-based
newsperson, explains that if selected as a juror, it is a "serious violation" to
speak to the attorneys or parties on the case. Mr. Holt further states that it is
improper to investigate the case "on your own" and specifically explains that
the jurors may not visit the scene of an accident. This type of explicit
instruction is an excellent step in the right direction. Further reiteration in this
regard by means of pre-voirdire and pre-oath instructions by the judge is a
simple step that could remedy many jury misconduct situations.
The second reformative measure which needs to be considered is the
drafting of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, which would again explicitly
inform jurors about the impropriety of conducting their own research or
speaking to any persons outside the jury about the case during deliberations.
Although jurors in Illinois are typically instructed at the close of evidence that
they are to consider only that information they received in the form of
evidence, it appears that many jurors do not understand that this means they
are not to consider information from any other source, even though that
information may be readily available to them in the form of a dictionary or
medical web site. Too much instruction, some would argue, is a dangerous
thing. For example, if jurors are explicitly told that their visiting the scene of
an accident could lead to the verdict being overturned, would this information
allow the disgruntled juror who feels outvoted to conduct such a visit purely
to allow for later reversal? While this scenario may represent a slim possibility,
it appears that the instructions need only be specific to what the jurors may or
may not do, rather than to the effect of their failure to follow such instructions.
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Another jury instruction that could be made at the close of evidence is
one which explains to jurors what actions should be taken if it is discovered
that they, or another juror, has intentionally or inadvertently failed to follow
the instructions. The jurors would essentially be told, for example, that if they
learn that another juror has brought outside information to the jury room, is
being violent to other jurors, has been absent for a matter of hours or other acts
of misconduct, they should report this information to the bailiff who will, in
turn, inform the court. If such an instruction is implemented, the incidents of
jury misconduct could possibly be dealt with by the trial court before they rise
to a level requiring verdict reversal.
The third reformative measure, which needs to be considered, is the
possibility of non-unanimous verdicts. For example, the suggestion has been
made by some practitioners that a vote of ten rather than all twelve jurors be
required - the thought being that this would lead to less violence and coercion
in the jury room. This suggestion, however, is one which we raise only
academically, for while this measure may lead to easier rendering of verdicts,
it would erase the fundamental right to a unanimous verdict and drastically
change the jury system we know today.
The last reformative measure is the potential of changing the standard of
review to allow the courts to examine the mental processes of the jury and
whether the misconduct affected their verdict. This measure, however, could
open a large Pandora's box of problems, forcing the judiciary to not only rely
on the opinions of the jurors themselves but to delineate between how strong
or weak the effect of the misconduct was. Perhaps, if this measure is to work,
it should be the trial judge, who knows the jury and who is in the best position
to determine any influences on it, who should make this decisiQn. The trial
judge's determination on this issue then would not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we believe incidents of juror misconduct could be reduced
if jurors are better instructed on not only what is expected of them but what is
prohibited. In the meantime, however, practitioners should be aware that the
majority of jury misconduct issues will not result in an overturned verdict
because of the constraints on the courts that prevent it from examining the
mental processes of the jury. Accordingly, changing this standard of review,
at least at the trial court level, is a measure that should be seriously considered.

